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The importance of animacy has been discovered in the perception literature, the 
neuroscience literature, and most recently in the memory literature. However, little is 
known about the extent to which we track the things that agents come into contact with 
in the environment, and its implications for human memory. Our memory system has 
been shaped by natural selection to assist in our ability to survive long enough to 
reproduce our genes. One of the major evolutionary influences on our survival would 
have been our ability to track, monitor, and predict the behavior of other agents 
because an agent can be a predator, potential food, potential mate (as described by the 
animate-monitoring hypothesis; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007), and even a source 
for contamination as stated by the law of contagion (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 
1986). Across three recall experiments, I examined if the human memory system was 
structured to prioritize objects that were touched by agents.  
Experiment 1 tested the incidental memory for objects that were acted upon by 
agents and other inanimate objects. Participants read sentences that described living 
and nonliving things interacting with an object, and then were asked to imagine each 
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scene and make an imagery rating. Participants were significantly better at 
remembering objects that were associated with the agents relative to inanimates. 
Experiment 2 investigated whether there would be mnemonic benefit for 
remembering the objects that were interacted with by an agent relative to a nonliving 
thing if participants were provided with the actors of the action (agent and inanimate) 
as a cue on a surprise recall test. Participants again created mental images and provided 
ratings. There was a significant improvement in memory for the target objects that 
were associated with a living thing compared to a nonliving thing.  
Experiment 3 examined whether the memory benefit for objects that were 
touched by agents could be due to the more vivid mental images participants were 
creating for the agentic sentences as compared to the inanimate sentences. All the 
sentences were changed to have the exact same action that was performed by the living 
and nonliving actor. On a surprise cued-recall test where the participants were given 
the actor and verb as a cue, memory performance for the target objects was superior if 
that object was touched by an animate relative to an inanimate. 
The consistent results across all three experiments support the idea that the 
human memory system is organized to track and remember the objects that living 
things interact with and physically touch. The mechanisms that allow for the mnemonic 
benefit are not yet understood, but it may be because there is an awareness (perhaps 
unconsciously) that living things are salient creatures in our environment that carry 
sickness, germs, and diseases. It is also possible that humans unknowingly track the 
objects that are owned or touched by agents because there is the common belief that 
characteristics of the agent get transferred to the object, which is referred to as the law 
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of contagion. Whether the reason for the enhanced memory is because both of these 










A method to construct an understanding of how our memory system is designed 
to operate is to take a functional approach and “forward engineer” hypotheses as 
termed by Nairne (2015). Unquestionably, natural selection shaped our cognitive 
systems to enhance our ability to live long enough by noticing, avoiding, and/or 
escaping predators in order to reproduce our genes. This ability was no easy feat, and 
our understanding of the selection pressures that built our system is being advanced 
every day. However, we are still on the cusp of explaining the function and purpose of 
our memory system, and this requires generating hypotheses about selection pressures 
that may have been present in our ancestral past. 
In order to examine this question, one must consider the specific problems in 
our environment that we needed to solve. Indeed, this is an empirical question and has 
been examined. Processing information for its survival relevance, contamination, and 
animacy has been shown to produce a memory advantage (see Nairne, 2015 for a 
review). A notable selection pressure would have been our ability to monitor and 
remember the behaviors of other living things, especially other humans. Humans and 
nonhuman animals (agents) would have been a categorical priority relative to nonliving 
things: humans for their potential to be a friend (e.g., an in-group member or a mating 
partner) or a foe (e.g., an out-group member, a cheater, a dangerous rival), and 
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nonhuman animals for their potential to be food (e.g., wild game), a shelter or tool 
(e.g., animal hide, bone), or a survival threat (Nairne & Panderiada, 2010; Orians & 
Heerwagen, 1992).  
There is a need to clarify the use of the terms agent and animate. Though these 
two concepts may be distinctly represented in the brain (Johnson, 2003; Lillard, Zeljo, 
Curenton, & Kaugars, 2000; Lou, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009; Mandler, 1992; 
Okita & Schwartz, 2006), the neural distinction is the representation and perception of 
self-initiated movement in combination with goal-orientated movement. The prior two 
types of movement are classified as an agent in human studies. A description provided 
by Gobbini et al. (2011) explains the difference, “Animate entities are living things that 
can act as agents. Living things that are not sentient and do not act as agents are not 
animate” (p. 1911).  He later states that agents are entities that generate their own 
movements in order to achieve goals. In this domain, animates refer to living beings 
such as humans and nonhuman animals, and does not include living things such as 
plants. For the purpose of this study, both terms will be used interchangeably, because 
the materials used in the experiment are animals (both animate and agentic) and objects 
(inanimate and not an agent). 
Combining agentic selection pressures with the functionalist reasoning for 
memory design, one can then hypothesize that memory would have been tuned for 
agents in our environment (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, 
Cogdill, & LeBreton, 2013). Agents would have been of critical importance in our 
ancestral environment, and therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that our 
memory system is biased to remember agents relative to nonliving things. Recently, 
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empirical evidence has been presented in support of this mnemonic advantage (Bonin, 
Gelin, & Bugaiska, 2014; Nairne et al, 2013; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Blunt, 
2013; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Cogdill, 2015). However, little is yet known 
about the extent to which our memory is tuned for the behavior of agents since this is a 
recent discovery in the literature. Additionally, limited work has focused on the 
theoretical framing to extend our predictions for mnemonic priorities in human 
memory. 
An evolutionary approach in the cognition literature has gained insight to the 
relevance of animacy as a dimension that shaped our ancestral brains. From prioritizing 
agents in our visual attention, tracking their behavior with things they own or touch, 
and automatically imparting properties that were transferred onto those objects, these 
operations have undoubtedly shaped our cognitive architecture. Therefore, I suggest 
our ability to remember objects that came into physical contact with other agents would 
have been an adaptive trait that arguably developed from contagion avoidance (Rozin 
& Nemeroff, 2002). 
In order to advance our knowledge for how our memory system is designed to 
monitor and remember things connected to agents, I propose to examine if there is a 
mnemonic component for the objects that are touched by agents relative to the objects 
that come into contact with each other. The ability to remember an artifact that an agent 
handled would have been adaptive for a few reasons. Preceding the identification of the 
objects, one must first identify the agent. Agents include human and nonhuman 
animals. It would be adaptive to assess that agents have intentions for their behavior 
based on internal goals. Our ability to attribute a mental state to other agents allowed 
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us to understand and predict their actions. This would have enabled us to avoid 
predators, catch prey, selectively mate, and attribute characteristics. Accordingly, the 
interactions between two agents or an agent and an object are relevant to the internal 
goals of the agent.   
Moreover, the physical contact between the agent and the object should be an 
important indicator for tracking ownership and property. Across cultures and in the lab, 
it has been observed that personal objects of agents are reported to contain an 
“essence” of the owner (see Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002, for a review). The essence 
transfer is a form of magical thinking called sympathetic magic. Specifically, it is 
called the law of psychological contamination (Frazer, 1895; Mauss, 1902). This 
implies that objects may be more than they appear because of the history of the artifact. 
In addition to psychological transfer of essence from agent to object, there is also the 
concept of contamination (or transfer of disease). Intrapersonal contact, which is 
primarily person (as opposed to a nonhuman animal) to object, then the object to 
another person is one typical way how illnesses spread. Sickly pathogens are also 
commonly spread from food that comes from living animals because meat tends to 
contain microbial bacteria that is not found in plants. 
I am proposing a hypothesis based on a functional interpretation of our memory 
system: If our memory system is designed to solve specific problems directly related to 
fitness, then in addition to remembering the agents themselves, we should have also 
have a special tuning for the objects that are touched by agents. I argue the locus of the 
mnemonic advantage, if there is one, is rooted in the physical contact itself between the 
agent and the object. My hypothesis would predict a mnemonic advantage for the 
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objects physically touched by agents relative to objects that physically touch each 
other. I would not expect a mnemonic advantage for the interacting objects because 
objects do not have ownership of other objects, and they are less likely to be the source 
of microbial contamination. 
The Animate-Monitoring Hypothesis 
Numerous attention paradigms have been employed to study animacy, and the 
findings are consistent: humans are able to detect agents in the environment quickly 
and accurately. This attentional bias is called the animate-monitoring hypothesis (New, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007).  This hypothesis assumes that agents change their status in 
the environment quicker and more frequently than non-agents like plants, objects, and 
natural formations. Because agents have active minds and are mobile, the constant 
monitoring and updating of their status would be critically needed by our attention 
system. Therefore, we required a visual processing mechanism that worked 
automatically to attribute attentional resources to animates relative to inanimates. To 
test this hypothesis, New et al. (2007) gave participants a change-detection task and 
asked them to detect a single change between two natural scenes across many different 
categories: human, nonhuman animals, plants, objects, tools, and vehicles. Participants 
were only given 250 ms to view the initial scene. The initial scene was followed by a 
250 ms mask then lastly another 250 ms for participants to view the paired (changed) 
scene and make the comparison judgment. The authors found that participants were 
able to detect the changes quicker and more reliably when those changes involved an 
agent (human or nonhuman animal) as compared to the other categories such as 
vehicles, even though people have more experience detecting vehicles in everyday life. 
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The remarkable speed of agent detection was later supported using a saccadic choice 
task. This paradigm was used to eliminate the possibility that participants were 
evaluating the changed scene for its global statistics, and not noticing the absence of 
the agent per se. However, it was revealed that agents were detected preceding the 
categorization of the scene (Crouzet, Joubert, Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2012), 
suggesting that rapid animal detection might be due to a mechanism that selects 
specific features special to agents.  
Further support for the animate-monitoring hypothesis has been found in 
inattentional blindness paradigms (Calvillo & Jackson, 2014; New & German, 2015), 
eye-tracking (Yang et al., 2012), visual searches (Jackson & Calvillo, 2013), and under 
high-perceptual load (Calvillo & Jackson, 2014; Jackson & Calvillo, 2013). During an 
inattentional blindness task, participants were actively engaged in attending to the 
visual scene, yet failed to notice when something had been added to the scene that did 
not typically belong considering the context. In a typical inattentional blindness task, 
the attention of the participant is directed elsewhere to complete a task, and they are not 
explicitly told something in the scene will change. The change-detection task, on the 
other hand, explicitly instructs participants in advance to seek out the change that had 
occurred between scenes. Calvillo and Jackson (2014) tested the susceptibility to 
inattentional blindness with animates or inanimates as the target of the change. 
Participants were shown a circular area of white space on the screen with a centered 
fixation cross for 1 second. Next, an array of words (four for the low-cognitive load 
condition, six for high-cognitive load) appeared along the circumference of the viewing 
area for 1 second, then immediately followed by a mask. The critical manipulation 
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occurred on the last trial in a set of three trials. On the fourth screen, the fixation cross 
was replaced with a picture of an animate (e.g., horse, baby) or inanimate thing (e.g., 
scissors, hammer). Participants were instructed to write down the word in the array that 
represented a color. They were not informed of the change to the fixation cross in the 
center of the screen. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked if they 
noticed anything other than the words that was not present in the previous trials. 
Consistent with the animate-monitoring hypothesis, participants were able to detect the 
change more frequently when the fixation cross changed to a living thing relative to an 
inanimate object.  
Most recently, New and German (2015) tested inattentional blindness for an 
evolutionary-threatening stimulus (a spider) relative to a modern threatening stimulus 
(hypodermic needle) and a nonthreatening stimulus (housefly). Participants were 
instructed to judge the relative length of two lines that were presented in the center of 
the screen. On the fourth judgment trial, one of the three types of stimulus appeared in 
one of four quadrants along with the line segments. Immediately following this critical 
trial, participants were asked if they saw anything in addition to the cross on the screen. 
If they indicated they noticed the change, they were asked to identify the location and 
the stimulus. Before the last expected judgment trial, participants were informed to 
ignore the judgment task and only pay attention to the display. On this last trial, one of 
the three types of stimulus appeared on the screen. Participants were asked the same 
questions from the critical fourth trial. In two experiments with varying stimuli that 
included scrambled and abstract representations, New and German (2015) found that 
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participants were better able to detect and identify a spider (evolutionary threat) as 
compared to a hypodermic needle (modern threat) and a housefly (no threat). 
By tracking the eye movements of participants when engaged in visualizing 
pictures of animates and inanimates, Yang et al. (2012) found that while equating 
valence, arousal, and other low-level visual features, animates were attended to for 
longer periods of time and visually preferred than inanimate objects. In a visual search 
task, Jackson and Calvillo (2013) found that participants processed and located animate 
things faster than inanimate things. Animates were least impacted by high perceptual 
load while inanimate detection was most slowed by perceptual load (Calvillo & 
Jackson, 2014; Jackson & Calvillo, 2013).  
Gelman (1990) pointed out the importance of causal principles when processing 
information directly related to the animate and inanimate relationship. She reasoned 
that animates are causal forces for self-generated movement but inanimates are not. 
Only an outside or external force can cause the movement of an inanimate object. In 
contrast, the reason for animate movement is purposeful and in direct response to the 
environment. When an animate changes its status by changing its location, it is intrinsic 
movement, but when an inanimate changes its status, it is an extrinsic cause. Moreover, 
in five experiments, Cohn and Paczynksi (2003) found that the capacity to predict a 
future event was facilitated by an agent serving as the critical causal role in the event 
relative to an animate recipient of an action. 
Property Tracking of Agents 
There have been numerous studies evaluating how objects that were once 
owned or touched by other people change in estimated value. Most recently, Newman 
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and Bloom (2014) had participants make bids on particular objects that were advertised 
as for sale from celebrity auctions. The authors found that the estimated amount of 
money that one would pay to own the objects for sale were directly related to the 
amount of physical contact assumed and the remaining “essence” left in the object. 
This finding was consistent with previous work that showed the greater the amount of 
inferred physical contact, the more money participants would be willing to pay (Lee, 
Linkenauger, Bakdash, Joy-Gaba, & Profitt, 2011; Newman & Dahr, 2014; Newman, 
Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011; Rozin, Nemeroff, Wane, & Sherrod, 1989). 
Additionally, the amount of money willing to be paid decreased if the objects were to 
be sterilized first, but much less of a decrease if the objects were to be moved to a new 
location before being sold. As noted by Rozin et al. (1989), the history associated with 
an object directly affected the perceived value of that object. An interesting study by 
Newman, Diesendruck, and Bloom (2011) found that the concept of contagion was the 
primary influence that drove the willingness to pay for an object. They independently 
manipulated the market demand, the association, or the psychological contamination of 
an object to a celebrity (liked and disliked), and found the degree of physical contact 
directly affected the valuation of the object independent from the association or the 
market demand. The concept of an “essence” transfer was offered as an explanation for 
the increased estimated value of the object.  
Secondly, recent work by DeScioli, Rosa, and Gutchess (2015) examined how 
memory was influenced by explicitly manipulating the association between an agent 
and an object. In three experiments, DeScioli et al. (2015) found that memory was 
enhanced for the object that was paired with an animate when the association was by 
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ownership, purposeful wanting, and thinking of the object relative to accidentally 
bumping into the object or the unrelated control. This study showed that intrinsic 
desires or ownership of an item lead to better memory for those items.  
Gelman, Noles, and Stilwell (2014) tested memory for the association between 
a person and an object. They wanted to explore possession tracking with children and 
adults (as a control) for two relevant reasons.  First, object tracking would allow one to 
monitor the history of the object. This would include information relevant for who or 
what has been in contact with it, and where it has been. This process would be directly 
related to the law of the contagion. Rozin and Nemeroff (1990) showed the strength of 
the perceptual influence of essence transfer when two things come into physical contact 
with each other. They showed that prior ownership of an object can have causal 
consequences, and people behave as if their interpretation of the object is the reality—
as in a sweater previously worn by Hitler still carries an essence of evil. Secondly, 
children have shown the propensity to remember and mimic the actions performed by 
adults when they manipulate new objects. Gelman et al. (2014) theorized that if there 
was an attentional bias to track the actions of agents, in addition to a tendency to track 
the objects they possess, then children should show specialized attention and memory 
for objects owned by agents. By the end of two experiments, Gelman et al. (2014) 
discovered that children as well as adults showed a memory advantage for objects 
owned by agents (in this case, themselves) compared to learning the novel label of the 
objects (i.e., Sarn, Koba, and Manu) and preference (i.e., “Which one do you like 
best?”). The results of this study were an important contrast to previous work with 
toddlers that found children tend to devote their attention to the perceptual features of 
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objects relative to the object history. Therefore, Gelman et al. (2014) suggested that 
tracking the contact or ownership history of an object is a basic human disposition.   
Sympathetic Magic: The Law of Contagion 
Agents and the properties they carry play a critical role in shaping our mental 
architecture, and this impact can be detected by examining the behavioral role of 
magical thinking. Sympathetic magic was introduced by Sir James Frazer 
(1890/1922/1959) and Marcel Mauss (1902/1972) who described the details of 
ritualistic supernatural behavior across the cultures of the world. Two universal laws 
were characterized: the law of similarity and the law of psychological contamination, 
or the law of contagion as it is now referred. The law of similarity states that when two 
or more things physically resemble each other, they are interpreted as sharing basic 
properties. The law of contagion states that when two or more things come into 
physical contact with each other, there is a perception of permanent transmission or 
transference of properties between the items. Taken together, these two laws explain 
how people behave as if their interpretation of the physical world is the perceived 
reality (Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002).  
The law of contagion dictates “once in contact, always in contact”, and 
typically describes a permanent transfer of an “essence” from one thing (the source) 
that is typically animate in nature to another thing (the target) that is typically 
inanimate in nature, but can be animate (Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002). Here, I will only 
focus on the importance of the law of contagion since it provides a complementary 
interpretation for why we would monitor, track, and remember objects that are touched 
by agents. Our ability to protect ourselves from potential contaminates, like unseen 
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pathogens or visible signs of polluted food, could have been modulated by disgust.  
Rozin and Nemeroff (2002) argued that what started out as a disgust domain to prevent 
our ancestors from ingesting contaminated food could have since been exapted to 
imbue physical and characteristic properties from physical contact. The operative 
behavior regarding the law of contagion has also shown to be asymmetrical in valence, 
repeatedly exhibiting stronger behavioral effects for negative attributes relative to 
positive ones (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Nemeroff, Brinkman, & Woodward, 1994; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Rozin, Markwith, & Nemeroff, 1992; Rozin, Millman, & 
Nemeroff, 1986).  
In effect, the law of contagion plays two roles for the hypothesis presented in 
this study. First, the permanent nature of the property transmission from one object to 
another would have helped us track and therefore remember certain qualities of a given 
object. Second, the transfer of physical properties (like germs, diseases, etc.) along 
with characteristic properties (the “essence”) can only be done via actual physical 
contact. These two assumptions in conjunction would have facilitated our behavior and 
beliefs surrounding human and nonhuman interactions with other things (whether 
animate or inanimate). 
Memory for Animates 
 There is now evidence for the direct mnemonic benefit of processing 
information for animates. A mnemonic preference for recalling animate words relative 
to inanimate words has been found for both incidental and intentional learning 
paradigms (Bonin, Gelin, & Bugaiska, 2014; Nairne, VanArsdall, Pandeirada, Cogdill, 
& LeBreton, 2013; VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, & Blunt, 2013). Firstly, Nairne et 
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al. (2013) evaluated the recallability norms published by Rubin and Friendly (1986) for 
the previously uncoded dimension of animacy. Using a regression analysis, the authors 
found that if a word was animate, it was one of the highest predictors for subsequent 
recall. Secondly, to test memory for animate and inanimate words directly, items were 
selected and matched across 10 dimensions, and participants were asked to learn the 
words across three study trials. Overall, participants were able to recall more animate 
than inanimate words consistently across all three free recall trials.  
Following this finding, VanArsdall et al. (2013) tested the hypothesis that 
animates should be better remembered than inanimates because of animate processing 
and not due to any prior knowledge or associations attributed to the items being 
learned. Ideally, this required participants to view nonwords. Across two experiments, 
participants rated each word for its degree of animacy represented by a short 
description provided with each word on the screen. For example: “FRAV has a round 
shape” (p.172). After a short delay, participants in the first experiment then performed 
an old-new recognition task, and participants in the second experiment performed a 
free recall task. Results revealed a consistent animacy advantage in recognition and 
recall as compared to inanimate words. The tendency to remember animates above and 
beyond inamates has since been replicated by Bonin et al. (2014) with processing 
picture stimuli. Importantly in the fourth experiment, the authors showed the 
mnemonic benefit for animate words was not because of differences in the richness of 
encoding from the perceptual or semantic features. The question still remains what 
kind of spontaneous encoding occurs when processing animate words that would lead 
to enhanced retention. 
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Most recently, VanArsdall and et al. (2015) reported an animacy effect in a 
paired-associate learning paradigm. In two experiments, the memory benefit for 
animacy processing was tested using Swahili (foreign language) and English word 
pairs.  An English word that was randomly paired with a Swahili word was represented 
as the fictional definition. Half of the English definitions were animate and the other 
half inanimate. Considering the potential difficulty of learning the English-Swahili 
word pairs, three learning trials were conducted in both experiments. As predicted, 
recall was consistently better for the animate “definitions” relative to the inanimate 
ones across all trials.  
In a related set of studies using paired-associate learning, memory was 
investigated for animate and inanimate pairs of words in an interactive imagery task. 
Wilton and Mathieson (1996) had participants read animate pairs of words that were 
embedded in a sentence then later tested with a surprise recall test. The sentences 
presented either used action verbs or a conjunction that linked the two critical words to 
be remembered.  In both studies, participants were asked to form a mental image of the 
sentence for 12 seconds. The sentences using action verbs to describe the interaction 
between two living things (e.g., “A gorilla threatening an ostrich”) produced better 
retention for the target word than the conjunction sentences (e.g., “The lizard and the 
whale”). In a follow-up study, Wilton (2006) used animal and object pairs but with an 
intentional learning design. The sentence syntax was similar to the sentences used in 
Wilton and Mathieson (1996)—the cue and target words were linked by an action verb 
or a conjunction. Participants were asked to create a mental image of the sentence read 
by the experimenter. A recognition test showed better accuracy for the action sentences 
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(e.g., “A chimpanzee sitting on an orange kettle”) compared to the non-interacting 
sentences (e.g., “A rabbit and a pink book”). Together, the Wilton and Mathieson 
(1996) and Wilton (2006) studies showed a memory benefit for the targets of a cue-
target pair using interactive imagery. However, the retention benefit for living targets 
compared to nonliving targets was not examined. In contrast Popp and Serra (2015) 
recently argued that memory was actually impaired for learning pairs of words in 
which one word was an animate. Across two experiments in a standard paired-associate 
task, participants learned animate-animate, animate-object, object-animate, or object-
object word pairs. Recall for the target word was worse in both experiments for the 
animate-animate word pairs (Experiment 1 and 3) compared to the object word pairs.  
Introduction to the Experiments 
In three experiments, I aimed to explore if there was a memory benefit for the 
inanimate objects that were manipulated by agents. Empirical data has shown there is 
an attentional bias for agents relative to non-agents, that we attribute internal goals, 
track their actions, and have greater memory for them. In this study, tracking an agent 
would include anything that it touched so we could later remember whether to avoid it 
to prevent contamination, to preserve it because of the special characteristics it may 
contain, or to allow the prediction of the agent’s behavior.  
Memory effects for animate and inanimate interactions have been previously 
done in the paired-associate learning paradigms with interactive imagery; however, to 
my knowledge no one has looked at recall of the target pair differentially between the 
living and nonliving actors (the one responsible for the action). On the other hand, 
there have been studies that found greater memory for objects that were labeled as 
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“owned” by an agent compared to a preference choice, a novel label (Gelman et al., 
2014), bumped into by an agent, or described as unrelated to an agent (DeScioli et al., 
2015).  
Since the goal of this study was to investigate the memory influence from an 
interaction that occurred between two things, it would be important to ensure the 
participants envisioned the interaction in a similar manner for the animate and 
inanimate actors. It has been repeatedly established that asking participants to create a 
dynamic, interactive mental image enhances memory for those objects relative to a 
non-interactive or side-by-side spatial representation (Wilton & Mathieson, 1996; 
Wilton, 2006). Therefore, dynamic sentences were created for all three experiments, 
and participants were asked to imagine the scene stated on the screen. Experiment 1 
was designed to test the memory effect for the target objects on a surprise free recall 
test. Experiment 2 tested whether the memory enhancement found in Experiment 1 
would persist on a cued-recall test where participants were given the actor and action 
originally encoded. The second experiment was also designed to investigate the 
accuracy of actor-target pairs.  Experiment 3 was intended to control for mental 
imagery between the sentences for living and nonliving actors. Participants completed 











The first study examined whether memory for objects would be influenced by 
the source of interactivity: a living agent or a nonliving object interacting with an 
object. In the first experiment, participants were presented with sentences that 
described a living agent and a nonliving object acting on a target object (displayed as a 
line drawing). Participants were not informed of the upcoming memory test, but were 
instructed to create a mental image of the event described in each sentence and to give 
a mental imagery rating after each sentence.  
I predicted that following a short delay, participants should have better recall 
performance for the objects that were interacted with by agents as compared to other 
inanimate objects. In the surprise recall task, they were prompted to try and recall as 
many of the pictures previously presented with the sentences. The pictures represented 
the object that was the recipient of the action in each sentence.  
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Sixty-four undergraduates (34 females and 30 males) from Purdue University 
volunteered in exchange for partial credit in an introductory psychology course. Actor 
type (animate or inanimate) was manipulated as a within-subject variable. Vividness 
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ratings for mental imagery and proportion of objects correctly recalled were the 
dependent variables. 
Materials 
Sentences were created with careful consideration for the actor in each 
sentence. The actor of each sentence (animate and inanimate) was selected from the list 
of words compiled in a previous unpublished study by VanArsdall, Nairne, Pandeirada, 
and Cogdill (2014). List items were drawn from two tightly-constrained categories (as 
opposed to broader categories like “living things” or “objects”) from the Van 
Overshchelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004) category norms: ten four-legged animals 
(e.g., rabbit and turtle) and ten pieces of furniture (e.g., chair and lamp). These twenty 
words were equated as close as possible on eight dimensions including category 
typicality, number of letters, frequency, familiarity, concreteness, imageability, 
meaningfulness, and number of intralist related semantic associations. See Appendix 
Table 1 for the means and statistical comparisons. Ten sentences described a four-
legged animal (animate) performing an action onto an object, and the other ten 
described a piece of furniture (inanimate) acting upon an object.  
Twenty pictures of objects were chosen from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart 
(1980) picture norms to represent the object that would be the recipient of the action in 
each sentence. Pictures were selected that were not in the furniture category norms and 
had at least a 90% agreement rate for naming the picture (except for word, glasses, 
which had a 64% agreement rate due to the other name provided, eye-glasses). 
Appendix Figure 4 displays the full set of pictures.  
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Twenty sentences were created with ten animate and ten inanimate actors 
paired with an object. Each object was displayed as a picture on the screen. The actions 
of the actor were selected from action verbs that could apply to both animates and 
inanimates allowing for counterbalancing the actor-action-object relationship across 
animates and inanimates. A total of ten verbs and verb phrases were used: breaking, 
covering, holding up, landing on, pressing against, bending, scraping, knocking over, 
falling onto, and destroying. A few examples of the sentences are “The lamp is 
destroying the wax candle / The rat is destroying the wax candle; The stool is falling 
onto the antique vase / The rabbit is falling onto the antique vase”. A second list of 
sentences was created. The actor-object pair was counterbalanced to ensure that each 
object was presented with both an animate and an inanimate actor. The counterbalance 
was done by replacing the actor from an animate to an inanimate and vice-versa. This 
resulted in a pair of lists, List 1 and List 2, as displayed in Appendix Table 2. An 
additional presentation order (a second version) was created for each list to counter a 
list effect. For example, this meant that for List 1, each sentence was randomly chosen 
to a different position in the presentation order, but controlling for the placement to not 
include more than two sentences in a row for each condition. The presentation order 
was counterbalanced for condition. If List 1 began with an animate sentence, then the 
other version of the list began with an inanimate sentence and so forth for the rest of 
the list. A total of four lists were used (two versions of each list), but any participant 
only studied one list of 20 sentences. Practice sentences were created using a 




Participants were brought in the lab to a computer terminal alone or in groups 
of up to four people. The instructions were presented by computer, but the recall test 
was done with pencil and paper. The experimental session lasted no longer than 30 
minutes. 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were instructed to perform the 
task according to the design adapted from McDaniel and Einstein (1986). Instructions  
asked the participants to focus on the mental imagery task during encoding. 
 
 
In the first task, you will see a series of sentences presented one at a time 
on the computer screen. Below each sentence there will be a picture of 
an object. Reach each sentence and try to form a mental image of the 
event described by each sentence. The picture is to help you form your 
mental image of the event occurring in the sentence. Try to maintain the 
image for the entire time the sentence appears on the screen. Each  
sentence will appear for 7 seconds. 
 
 
Animate and inanimate sentences were randomly intermixed within the session, 
but no more than two actors of the same type were presented consecutively. After the 
sentence and picture appeared on the screen for 7 seconds, the display changed to 
prompt participants to provide a rating for the vividness of their mental image on a 
scale from 1 (not a very clear image) to 5 (clear, vivid image). They were given 5 
seconds to input their vividness rating. All participants completed a practice trial with 
two sentences to read and rate: one animate actor and one inanimate actor.  
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Following the encoding task, participants completed a math-based distractor for 
approximately two minutes. The final phase was the surprise free recall task. 
Participants were asked to freely recall as many of the pictures they previously viewed 
in the first phase of the experiment. They were told they would have five minutes to 
write down on a sheet of paper as many names of the pictures as they could remember, 
and may write them down in any order they wished. The computer displayed a 
countdown timer during the recall period. At the end of the experiment, they were 
asked to answer two demographic questions inquiring about their gender and native 
language. 
Results 
As predicted the proportion of recall for the target objects was higher for those 
that were in contact with an animate versus an inanimate, t(63) = 2.57, p = .01; 
Cohen’s d = .32, 95% CI [ .07, .57]. As shown in Figure 1, participants freely recalled 
more of the target objects acted upon by living agents (M = .40, SD = .17, SEM = .02) 
than nonliving things (M = .34, SD = .16, SEM = .02), even though the exact same 
action was performed in each case. The average number of intrusions was also 
evaluated. Two kinds of intrusions were possible: words that didn’t appear in the study 
sentences (extra-list intrusions) and words that were the actors in the sentences (e.g., 
rabbit, and stool). Overall, intrusions were few, but there were significantly fewer 
extra-list intrusions (M = 0.55, SD = 0.94) than actor intrusions (M = 1.28, SD = 1.91), 
t(63) = 3.64, p < .001. Interestingly, 67% of the actor intrusions were the previously 




























































The ratings for mental imagery of the animate-actor sentences were more vivid 
than the inanimate-actor sentences, t(63) = 5.83, p < .001. An animal interacting with 
an object was rated as more vivid (M = 3.52, SD = 0.74, SEM = 0.09) than the furniture 
interacting with another object (M = 3.00, SD = 0.62, SEM = 0.08) even though, again, 
exactly the same target object and action verb were involved in each case (across 
participants).  
Discussion 
The first experiment supported my prediction that if a living agent interacted 
with an object, the memory for the object would be influenced. Specifically, incidental 
encoding of a living agent interacting with an object resulted in better memory for the 
object. The results of Experiment 1 complemented the findings from Gelman et al. 
(2014) and DeScioli et al. (2015). Memory was enhanced for the target objects without 
a reference to ownership between the actor and object. Moreover, the animate-
monitoring hypothesis predicted this result. Though the effects via physical contact has 
been investigated in terms of estimated value, desire of ownership, affect, and 
willingness to consume or purchase, the effect of animate interaction on memory has 
also not been investigated until now. The law of contagion, as manipulated by physical 
contact in previous studies, would have also predicted this pattern of results because it 
would be important to trace the source of the contact for subsequent decision-making.  
However, several interpretive problems remain. It would be reasonable to argue 
that the mnemonic benefit in recall could partly be due to the greater accessibility of 
the agent actors relative to the nonliving actors, which then facilitated the recall of the 
paired object. This argument would also be supported by the difference in vividness 
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ratings between the living and nonliving sentences. According to previous work in the 
interactive imagery literature by Wilton and Mathieson (1996) and Wilton (2006), I 
would not necessarily expect an imagery rating difference between the living and 
nonliving sentences. The Wilton studies did not find significant imagery differences 
between animals that interacted with each other or animals that interacted with objects 
compared to non-interacting imagery. However, the interactive imagery ratings have 
not been looked at independently for living and nonliving actions. Therefore, 
Experiment 2 was designed to correct the concern of unmatched accessibility between 











The purpose of the second experiment was to eliminate the possibility of 
differential access to the actors of the sentences during the recall task. In doing so, 
recall for Experiment 2 was a cued-recall test. The participants were given all the 
actors and actions of the sentences previously encoded and were asked to recall the 
object that had been acted upon by each given actor. This change made the recall task 
more similar to paired-associate learning. This was desirable because the contagion 
hypothesis assumes the participant remembers the source (the actor) of the physical 
interaction as well as the recipient (the object), and it is this relationship that increases 
or decreases the value of an object (Newman & Bloom, 2014). A cued-recall test 
required the participants to remember the original pairing of the actor and object. 
Apart from the recall task, the rest of the experimental design was the same as 
Experiment 1. The sentences provided to the participants were the same as presented 
previously. Similarly, everyone was asked to rate the vividness of their mental images 
after each sentence.  
First, I predicted a boost in recall performance for both conditions compared to 
the first experiment because of the change from a free to cued-recall test. Second, I 
predicted a replication of the results from Experiment 1. There should be better recall 
accuracy for objects that interacted with agents relative to inanimate objects. 
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Additionally, because the actors would be provided to the participants at test, I 
predicted fewer extra-list intrusions than the first experiment and near zero actor 
intrusions. No changes were made to the sentences or the rating task; therefore, I 
predicted the imagery ratings to be similar to the ones reported in Experiment 1.  
Method 
Subjects and Design 
Sixty-four undergraduates (24 female and 40 male) from an introductory 
psychology course participated in exchange for course credit. None of the students 
from Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 2. A simple design was used with actor 
type (animate or inanimate) manipulated within-subjects. Imagery ratings and 
proportion of objects correctly recalled were collected. 
Materials 
All the sentences used for Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 2 in the 
same counterbalancing conditions using two primary lists (four study lists in total). 
Procedure 
The same encoding and distractor methods from Experiment 1 were used for 
Experiment 2. Each participant was provided with the same instructions and distractor 
task as the first experiment. Each participant read 20 sentences in total; half of the 
sentences described an animate interacting with an object, and the remaining half 
described an inanimate interacting with an object. All participants completed a practice 
trial with two untested sentences. Following each sentence, participants rated their 
mental imagery and then completed a math-based distractor task for approximately two 
minutes. The final task was the surprise cued-recall test. The recall paper had the 
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sentences previously presented but randomly re-ordered with a blank at the end of the 
sentence where the recipient object was presented (remember, this was also represented 
as a picture during the encoding phase). For example, an inanimate cue would be “The 
lamp is destroying the __________”, and the animate cue would be “The rat is 
breaking the __________”. All participants received the same recall sheet with the 
cues in the exact same order. They were given 5 minutes to complete as many 
sentences as possible. After the recall test, they were asked but not required to answer 
two demographic questions inquiring about gender and native language. 
Results 
Figure 2 shows the overall level of performance was higher than in Experiment 
1. As predicted, the proportion of recalled objects was significantly greater if interacted 
with by an animate relative to an inanimate, t(63) = 4.03, p < .001; Cohen’s d = .50, 
95% CI [.24, .76]. This meant participants correctly remembered more of the agent 
actor-object pairs (M = .64, SD = .23, SEM = .03) than the inanimate actor-object pairs 
(M = .54, SD = .21, SEM = .03). There were few extra-list intrusions (M = 0.81, SD = 
1.39), which was expected considering they were presented with the partial sentences. 
The type of target intrusion was analyzed. These were target objects that were recalled, 
but paired with the wrong actor source. Target intrusions were examined as whether 
they were originally encoded as being in contact with an agent or an inanimate. Target 
intrusions were mostly those that were processed as interacting with an inanimate (M = 
1.18, SD = 0.90), relative to an animate (M = 0.57, SD = 0.73), t(43) = 3.55, p < .001. 
This was an expected result from the recall data. Since participants recalled more of the 



























































associated with the inanimate actors free to retrieve. Therefore, this particular analysis 
of the target intrusions does not offer much insight for the pattern of mistakes made by 
the participants.  
The mental imagery ratings for the two kinds of sentences were statistically 
different. Participants reported clearer mental images for the sentences with an animate 
actor (M = 3.66, SD = 0.70, SEM = 0.09) relative to an inanimate actor (M = 3.05, SD = 
0.70, SEM = 0.09), t(63) = 8.10, p < .0001.  
Discussion 
This second experiment supported the results found in Experiment 1 depicting 
greater memory for the objects that were interacted with agents as compared to 
inanimates. Performance was better overall in this experiment, and that was most likely 
due to the change in recall procedure. Though the pattern of results were as predicted, 
it was surprising to get a medium-size effect in Experiment 2. The persistence of the 
effect was reassuring considering one of the reasons for the change was the concern 
about differential access to the actors in the sentences that could be retrieved and serve 
as a cue for the target object. Keeping this factor constant across participants and 
sentences did not eliminate the effect discovered in the first experiment. 
The fewer errors that were made during the recall task for the animate relative 
to the inanimate condition was not surprising considering participants accurately 
recalled more target objects that were paired with agents. Taking this into account, it 
left more target objects that were paired with inanimates freely available for the 
participant to retrieve. This would explain the larger proportion of target errors for 
objects that were processed as interacting with a nonliving thing.  
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The persistent difference in mental imagery between the conditions was 
troubling, however. Across both experiments, there were rather large differences in the 
clarity ratings between the living and nonliving sentences, meaning the sentences that 
depicted a living thing were a more vivid mental picture. This was a problem because it 
could be argued that if the participants found it easier to access clear, vivid mental 
images during the recall task than less vivid ones, this could explain the pattern of 
results in the recall data for both experiments.  
Lastly, participants provided feedback at the end of the experiment that 
described any difficulties, if any, while creating the mental images. One comment that 
was reported 48% of the time was that if the actor and object were largely different in 
scale, they experienced difficulty imagining the event described (e.g., “The actions 
seemed out of order”, “The actions didn’t make sense because the larger one was 
doing something to the smaller one”). The other comment reported by 42% of the 
participants was that it was difficult to create a mental image if the actor and object 
didn’t normally appear together in everyday life. Experiment 3 was designed to try and 
correct as many scale differences as possible between the actor and object. Lastly, 
Experiment 3 was designed to use the same action verb for all the living and nonliving 
actors because a large proportion of participants reported difficulty creating a mental 











According to the law of contagion, physical contact between the actor and the 
object is the driving factor for perceived change in the physical properties of the object 
(Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Newman & Bloom, 2014; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 
1986). To ensure the interactions between the actor and object are physical, the verbs in 
Experiment 3 were all changed to “touching”. This action verb was chosen because it 
implied direct physical contact, and importantly it should be reasonably simple to 
imagine for both living and nonliving actors.  
A second change to the stimuli was made because of the feedback from 
participants. Some reported it was difficult to create a mental image for the sentences if 
there was a difference in physical size between the actor and object. This discrepancy 
was corrected by replacing pictures of objects that are small in nature to ones that are 
larger and more similar to the sizes of the actors. 
The predictions for Experiment 3 were the same as in the second experiment.  
Method 
Subject and Design 
Participants were part of an introduction to psychology course at Purdue 
University. Sixty-four people (37 female, 27 male) volunteered in exchange for partial 
course credit. Anyone who participated in the previous experiments was not eligible to 
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participate in Experiment 3. Actor type (animate or inanimate) was manipulated 
within-subjects. 
Materials 
There were two changes to the sentences used from the previous experiments. 
First, all of the action verbs were changed to “touching”, which could be applied to 
living and nonliving things. Second, “sofa” was replaced with “shelf” to reduce the 
intralist similarity in the inanimate condition caused by “couch” and “sofa”. The 
replacement made the intralist relationship more equal to the animate word list. A new 
statistical comparison was made between the animate and inanimate items because of 
the word change. There was only one marginal difference between the four-legged 
animals category and the furniture category items among the eight dimensions. The 
animal category contained words that were marginally more concrete (p = .05), but the 
two categories did not differ in imageability values. (See Appendix Table 3 for the 
means and statistical comparisons). As in the previous experiments, two study lists 
were created that counterbalanced each object to be paired with both an animate and an 
inanimate actor. Each list was then reordered to counterbalance list effects. Four study 
lists were used in this experiment. The two primary lists are displayed in Appendix 
Table 4. 
The third change to the stimuli was to the pictures (objects that were the 
recipients of the action). Approximately half of the pictures were changed to be more 
equivalent in physical size to the actors as an attempt to equalize the mental imagery 




The procedure used in Experiment 2 was used for Experiment 3. Participants 
were given a cued-recall test in which the beginning of each sentence served as the cue. 
Results 
As predicted the results replicated the pattern from Experiment 2. Figure 3 
shows that recall performance for target objects was better for those touched by agents 
relative to inanimate things, t(63) = 4.77, p < .0001; Cohen’s d = .60, 95% CI [.33, 
.86]. The average recall of targets for the agent-actor sentences was .47 (SD = .27, SEM 
= .03), and .35 (SD = .26, SEM = .03) for the inanimate-actor sentences,     
respectively. There were extremely few extra-list intrusions (M = 0.28, SD = 0.78). 
However, there was approximately the same number of target intrusions in this 
experiment as compared to Experiment 2. Again, there were fewer errors made for the 
target objects that were touched by an agent (M = 0.63, SD = 0.85) as compared to 
those touched by an inanimate (M = 1.04, SD = 0.80), t(50) = 2.44, p = .02, but this 
was not surprising considering the proportion of recall was greater for the animate-
targets. 
The mental imagery ratings were more similar between conditions than the 
previous experiments. Participants reported almost numerically equal mental image 
clarity, however, the difference approached significance, t(63) = 2.06, p = .04. The 
average vividness rating for the animates that touched an object was 3.58 (SD = 0.81, 
SEM = 0.10), and a slightly lower average for the inanimates that touched an object (M 





























































Incidental memory for objects that were touched by animates versus inanimates 
was measured with a cued-recall test. Similar to the pattern of results in Experiment 2, 
memory was enhanced for objects that came into physical contact with animates 
relative to inanimates. Additionally, as desired, the difference in imagery ratings was 
more equivalent, though the animate sentences were rated as significantly more vivid 
than the inanimate sentences.  
Overall, recall performance was lower in this experiment compared to 
Experiment 2. This most likely was because all the actions provided were the same, 
whereas in the previous experiments, ten unique action verbs were used. The use of 
varying actions could allow for participants to more easily discriminate among actors, 
however, all verbs were used equally across animate and inanimate sentences for each 
participant. 
The significant difference between the mental imagery ratings was not ideal. 
However, if the ability of the participant to retrieve the target object for each actor was 
primarily due to the vividness of the mental image, then I would have expected the 
recall results to closely mimic the imagery ratings. This was not the finding. The 
memory effect in recall persisted despite the drastic reduction in rating differences. It is 
also worth noting that by changing the action verb in this experiment, it raised the 
vividness ratings for the inanimate sentences to the average level of the animate 











The purpose of this study was to investigate if there was a memory effect for 
objects that were touched by living things. Specifically, if an object was touched by a 
living thing, would that object be better remembered than if it were touched by a 
nonliving thing? Three experiments were designed to test this question. Whether 
memory was tested in a free-recall task (Experiment 1) or in cued recall (Experiment 2 
and 3), there was a consistent mnemonic benefit for objects touched by animates 
relative to inanimates. Importantly, in all three experiments, participants were not 
expecting the recall test. Taken together, these three experiments support the idea that 
our memory systems may be “tuned” for attributing priority to objects that come into 
physical contact with an agent. 
I discussed two primary reasons one might expect a memory advantage for 
objects that were in physical contact with an agent relative to a nonliving thing. First, 
there has been strong evidence suggesting that our cognitive systems are especially 
sensitive to animate agents. It is possible that memory is enhanced for agents and 
anything they touch simply because processing a scene involving a living thing is 
enough to enhance memory, not necessarily because of the physical contact involved. 
On the other hand, there are good reasons to suspect that physical contact might be 
important. The law of contagion, one of the two laws of sympathetic magic, suggests 
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that when two objects come into physical contact, a transfer of “essence” occurs. 
Agent-to-object transfer is the most common type of transfer belief recorded in practice 
in Western and Eastern cultures (Frazer, 1959; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). There is a 
strong behavioral response to the interpretation of a transferred “essence” from the 
agent via ownership or by physical contact. Experiment 3 was specifically designed to 
make the physical contact between the actor (living or nonliving) and the object clear 
to the participants. All the objects were explicitly touched by a living and nonliving 
thing, and the results replicated the previous experiments. In conclusion, whether the 
mnemonic benefit was from agency, the physical contact, or the combination of both 
has yet to be distinguished. 
The findings of this study are in contrast to the findings of a recent paired-
associate learning study using animate and inanimate pairs. In two experiments using 
animate and object pairs, Popp and Serra (2015) found that the animate-animate pairs 
produced the worst performance (Experiment 1 and 3). Their first study had 
participants study animal-animal and object-object pairs then gave them a cued-recall 
test with the left stimulus word as the cue. Recall accuracy was higher for the object-
object pairs compared to the animal-animal pairs. Their third study had participants 
study animal-animal, animal-object, object-animal, and object-object pairs. Again, 
object-object performance was significantly better compared to the other three 
conditions. It is reasonable to consider that in the Popp and Serra (2015) study, 
participants were learning the pairs without any context or use of interactive imagery 
that were provided in this study. This could be a reason for the difference in recall, 
especially considering the same categorical word pairings were used by Wilton and 
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Mathieson (1996) and Wilton (2006) with an interactive imagery design and showed 
cued recall results in contrast to Popp and Serra (2015).  
Results from the current study also support the work done by Wilton and 
Mathieson (1996) and Wilton (2006) using interactive imagery. Wilton and Mathieson 
(1996) used animal-animal pairs in an incidental paired-associate learning design 
manipulating interactive imagery. They found in two experiments that recognition of 
the target was better for the interactive imagery compared to the control. Wilton (2006) 
replicated his results in a cued-recall test using animal-object pairs. Across three 
experiments, recall of the target objects was highest when the processing involved the 
use of interactive imagery between the animal and object. The results from these two 
studies, in combination with the current study provide support that the interaction 
between a living and nonliving thing facilitates the memory advantage. 
There was a concern regarding the mental image rating difference discovered 
in all three experiments. In previous interactive imagery studies that implemented 
imagery ratings and used living and nonliving stimuli (as either the stimulus, response, 
or both), no rating differences were reported (Wilton, 2006; Wilton & Mathieson, 
1996; Winograd & Lynn, 1979). However, there are important differences. First, one 
study mixed animate and inanimate pairs for a collapsed rating value (Winograd & 
Lynn, 1979). Wilton (2006) used all animate-inanimate pairs, and Wilton and 
Mathieson (1996) used all animate-animate pairs. Therefore, imagery ratings have not 
been separated between animate-object and inanimate-object pairs.  
One could argue that the difference in mental image clarity could have 
contributed to the mnemonic benefit for the sentences that had the most vivid image. 
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This could have been the case for Experiment 1 and 2. However, the rating differences 
for Experiment 3 were numerically closer compared to the previous experiments. The 
ratings for the inanimate sentences also increased to the average ratings for the animate 
sentences. This would suggest that making the sentences more similar in structure 
(same action verb or less dynamic verb) allowed the inanimate actions to be easier to 
mentally imagine. Finally, since the recall advantage between the two conditions did 
not decrease relative to each other when the imagery ratings nearly equalized, this 
would suggest the vividness of the mental images was not the locus of the recall effect. 
A second limitation in this study was the unintended inferential differences 
between animate and inanimate actors that performed an action. In other words, when a 
participant read “The wolf is touching the football”, it was likely that the mental image 
included the wolf using a limb or limbs to do the action. For the inanimate sentences 
like “The dresser is breaking the plastic drum”, the mental image created would not 
include a limb executing the action since a piece of furniture does not have limbs. 
Therefore, the actions depicted in the sentences for all three experiments were not 
controlled for this factor. This was a limitation recognized after Experiment 2. 
However, it was not clear after the first two experiments if the physical contact 
between the actor and the object was processed by the participant. Therefore, it was 
decided that Experiment 3 should first make the physical contact salient to the 
participants to determine if the memory effect would reproduce. Whether or not the 
locus of the memory advantage is due to the physical contact or not has yet to be 
determined. 
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Lastly, another limitation to the present study was the normality of the 
interactions. Because of the nature of the stimuli chosen for the actors in the sentences 
(animals and furniture), it was impossible to choose objects that both categories of 
words would ordinarily interact. The objects that animals touch are typically not the 
same objects that pieces of furniture touch. Therefore, it was possible that the 
interactions between the animals and objects were more distinctive in nature than the 
interactions between the furniture pieces and other objects. It was also possible that this 
distinction was independent of the ability for the participants to create a clear, mental 
image. All three experiments were conducted with animacy manipulated as a within-
subjects variable. This would mean that if distinctiveness were somehow responsible 
for the memory advantage, it would only be detected in a between-subjects 
manipulation because distinctiveness effects are eliminated when the participants can 
no longer make relative judgments between items. I would predict that if the recall 
advantage was mostly because of distinctiveness, there would be no recall difference 
between objects touched by animates and inanimates. This would be an important 
consideration for a follow-up study. 
The three experiments in this study provided some insight for broader learning 
implications, specifically for educational purposes. Well-established methods for 
enhanced learning of words include retrieval practice, producing a mental image, 
processing it for survival, and processing it for animacy. Though the results of this 
study are yet unclear for identifying the locus of the mnemonic effect, it is clear a 
retention benefit is produced when participants process stimuli for its specific 
association to a living thing. There is potential to enhance learning for students by 
41 
instructing them to imagine a living thing (e.g., their friend, sibling, pet, or themselves) 
interacting with the stimulus that is to-be-learned. For example, when students in 
elementary school are trying to learn new words, this strategy has the potential to 
encapsulate their active imaginations while enhancing their learning for the words. This 
learning strategy would also be applicable to adults when learning a new language. For 
instance, VanArsdall et al. (2015) demonstrated better memory for the (fabricated) 
English translation of Swahili words when the Swahili word was processed as 
representative of a living thing. The results from VanArsdall et al. (2015) and the 
current study suggest learning of educational material can be strengthened if students 
generated associations of the material to living things.  
In conclusion, the purpose of this study was to further our understanding of 
the memory architecture. A functionalist theory for memory design would predict 
selective retention for information relevant to enhancing fitness. The selection 
pressures for perceptually identifying and attending to living agents relative to other 
objects and moving objects in the environment has been repeatedly demonstrated. Only 
recently has the animacy dimension been investigated for the effect it has on memory. I 
proposed there would be an adaptive value for remembering the objects that were in 
contact with a living agent relative to another inanimate object. Whether the object 
retained a special “essence” from the living agent that touched it, whether the object 
was a source for contamination, or whether the object was better remembered because 
it was associated with a living agent could all be adaptive reasons for enhanced 
retention of the target object.   
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Animate and Inanimate Sentences Used in Experiments 1 and 2 
List 1 List 2 
The sofa is pressing against the leather shoe The sofa is covering the toy football 
The rat is breaking the lead pencil The rat is destroying the wax candle 
The sheep is covering the toy football The sheep is knocking over the aluminum ladder 
The bed is scraping the reading glasses The bed is pressing against the inflated ball 
The wolf is holding up the cotton sock The wolf is bending the steel nail 
The dresser is breaking the plastic drum The dresser is falling onto the smoking pipe 
The couch is covering the small clock The couch is landing on the shiny whistle 
The rabbit is landing on the shiny whistle The rabbit is falling onto the antique vase 
The cabinet is bending the steel nail The cabinet is scraping the dinner fork 
The fox is pressing against the inflated ball The fox is covering the small clock 
The stool is falling onto the antique vase The stool is breaking the lead pencil 
The lamp is destroying the wax candle The lamp is holding up the outside flag 
The tiger is bending the metal bell The tiger is holding up the wooden broom 
The mouse is scraping the dinner fork The mouse is landing on the empty bottle 
The chair is knocking over the aluminum ladder The chair is destroying the cotton sock 
The turtle is knocking over the food bowl The turtle is pressing against the leather shoe 
The desk is landing on the empty bottle The desk is bending the metal bell 
The cat is falling onto the smoking pipe The cat is breaking the plastic drum 
The table is holding up the wooden broom The table is knocking over the food bowl 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Animate and Inanimate Sentences Used for Experiment 3 
 
List 1 List 2 
The cat is touching the telephone The cat is touching the barrel 
The dresser is touching the vase The dresser is touching the umbrella 
The couch is touching the bicycle The couch is touching the clock 
The mouse is touching the sled The mouse is touching the guitar 
The lamp is touching the bottle The lamp is touching the basket 
The wolf is touching the football The wolf is touching the bicycle 
The rabbit is touching the shoe The rabbit is touching the box 
The stool is touching the guitar The stool is touching the telephone 
The fox is touching the basket The fox is touching the broom 
The bed is touching the suitcase The bed is touching is the piano 
The sheep is touching the umbrella The sheep is touching the bottle 
The turtle is touching the wagon The turtle is touching the vase 
The table is touching the ladder The table is touching the wagon 
The cabinet is touching the barrel The cabinet is touching the sled 
The rat is touching the clock The rat is touching the suitcase 
The chair is touching the broom The chair is touching the shoe 
The bear is touching the television The bear is touching the ladder 
The desk is touching the box The desk is touching the football 
The tiger is touching the piano The tiger is touching the flag 














Figure 4. Picture drawings selected from Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980). Names of 
pictures from left to right: ball, bell, bottle, bowl, broom, candle, clock, drum, flag, 









Figure 5. Picture drawings selected from Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980). Names of 
pictures from left to right: barrel, basket, bicycle, bottle, box, broom, clock, flag, 
football, guitar, ladder, piano, shoe, sled, suitcase, telephone, television, umbrella, 
wagon, vase. 
 
